“Polanyi has . . . developed his understanding of the process of scientific discovery by exploring two concepts that he has isolated: intuition and imagination. He elaborates four categories of intuition, the first of which, dynamic intuition, just is this integrative skill of tacit foreknowing and is the one on which I will presently focus my attention.

Strategic intuition accounts for the scientist’s ability to assess whether the importance of the problem and possible discovery at hand would warrant the investment of the powers and resources requisite for its pursuit. This is intuition in its more practical outworking. Strategic intuition compares its sense of the hidden reality discovered, and its importance, with the general philosophical and economic tenor of the society and time in which the scientist functions, and with the various resources at his disposal. Polanyi’s elucidation of this aspect of science compares positively with C. S. Peirce’s work on the economy of research.

“Creative intuition is the term Polanyi gives to the tacit powers that evoke the final, spontaneous integration that constitutes the discovery. Creative intuition ‘fills’ the empty focus, which has, up to this point, been the unknown center of significance for the subsidiary clues. With the climactic event of discovery, clues are transformed in a focus of meaning, and intimations and anticipations are borne out. In light of the foregoing intimations and anticipations, in fact, the discovery is recognized as such; by the time the discovery appears on the scene, though it may still be surprising, it bears an aura of familiarity as a result of the discoverer’s anticipations.

“A final form of intuition, which I shall call ‘confirmatory’ intuition (Polanyi does not give a name to what he describes), consists of the intuitive recognition of the result as valid. Confirmatory intuition may be heavily relied upon, to the relative exclusion of articulate confirmation, for even years after the discovery, depending upon the relative wealth or poverty of evidence for the claim. It is never wholly eliminated either, given the tacit foundation of all knowledge.

“But let us return to dynamic intuition. Dynamic intuition is active specifically in the problem and process stages of a scientific discovery. It is responsible for the very glimpse of a hidden coherence that can be designated a problem; the glimpse that sparks puzzlement and interest in the scientist, and eventually provokes him to sustained research. It operates between the problem and the discovery, actually guiding the scientist’s progress, by providing the scientist with what Polanyi refers to frequently as a ‘sense of the increasing proximity of the solution.’ Dynamic intuition recognizes clues and somehow ‘measures the distance’ between the present understanding and the intuited focus. Polanyi draws on his own scientific experience as well as everyday experience for the recognition of this sense of increasing proximity. He points out that we have all experienced it in the common attempt to remember someones name; we know somehow that we are close and then closer to having it; we speak of its being ‘on the tip of my tongue.’

“Foreknowledge of a solution and a sense of increasing proximity to it both retain a slight air of paradox, given the inability to explain them in any explicit fashion. But it is, in fact, nothing short of amazing that puzzles and mysteries can be solved, that babies can learn to speak and move through their world, and that scientists can make earthshaking discoveries-all of which involve the tacit recognition of unspecifiable clues. Polanyi captures the appropriate sense of wonder in his citation of [mathematician George] Polya:

The process of solving a mathematical problem continues to depend, therefore, at every stage on the same ability to anticipate a hidden potentiality which will enable the student first to see a problem and then to set out to solve it. Polya has compared a mathematical discovery consisting of a whole chain of consecutive steps with an arch, where every stone depends for its stability on the presence of others, and he pointed out the paradox that the stones are in fact put in one at a time. Again, the paradox is resolved by the fact that each successive step of the incomplete solution is upheld by the heuristic anticipation which originally evoked its invention: by the feeling that its emergence has narrowed further the logical gap of the problem.

“Dynamic intuition, unspecifiable capacity that it is, leads to the solution, for it gives rise to a tacit understanding of the focus and of the path toward it: ‘This is how I would resolve the paradox of the “Meno”: We can pursue scientific discovery without knowing what we are looking for, because the gradient of deepening coherence tells us where to start and which way to turn, and eventually brings us to the point where we may stop and claim a discovery.’

“It may be objected that use of the term ‘intuition’ only serves to fuel the fire of the critic’s claim that Polanyi’s work sanctions mysticism. The term, of course, may be a little misleading, but its choice can be justified As for the concept itself, Polanyi does not have a mystical source of knowledge in mind — in the sense of one that provides knowledge immediately or irrationally. The heart of the matter is that intuition is just the ordinary integrative skill that characterizes every form of human achievement: ‘not the supreme immediate knowledge, called intuition by Leibniz or Spinoza or Husserl, but a work-a-day skill for scientific guessing with a chance of guessing right.’ Besides, the skill of integration to an as-yet-uncomprehended focus is remarkable enough in itself, especially to those of us raised in a milieu that has set explicit knowledge as its paradigm and ideal and presumed that nothing in addition is required for scientific success.

“Does the appellation ‘intuition’ suggest infallibility? If it does, it is not that Polanyi means it to. Human knowledge ‘comprises everything in which we may be totally mistaken,’ and tacit, intuitive knowledge is not exempt. But neither does this imply that there is nothing at all to this so-called faculty of intuition, or that ‘intuition’ really falsely represents an activity that merely is a matter of chance. Polanyi says: ‘The fact that this faculty often fails does not discredit it; a method for guessing 10% above average in roulette would be worth millions.’ If no such faculty were operative, a scientist would be left with the overwhelming task of testing an infinite number of alternative solutions to a problem and, more basically, with deciding between an infinite number of possible problems ranging in undetectable potential from good to bad and specious. Finally, if ever the scientist reached the solution, he would fail to recognize it. The fact that this is not what happens in science, that real discovery occurs without an infinite number of attempts and that results are confidently maintained, testifies to the existence of this intuitive skill.”

— from Esther Lightcap Meek, Contact with Reality: Michael Polanyi’s Realism and Why It Matters (Cascade Books, 2017)

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